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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Article VIII, Section 5, of the Utah
Constitution; Utah Code Annotated §78-2a-3(2)(j).
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1)

Is there sufficient evidence in the record to support the trial court's
finding of fact as to the reasonable value of the improvements to
Defendant's property, which the court found to be not less than
$81,800.00?
The standard of review for this issue is the "clearly erroneous" standard

as set forth in Rule 52(a), Utah R. Civ. P., which states that findings of facts
"shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous."

See also, Holman v.

Sorenson. 556 P.2d 499, 500 (Utah 1976) (the Court will not disturb finding
"if there is a reasonable basis in evidence to support it."). However, the high
degree of deference otherwise accorded to a trier of fact's findings will not be
accorded in cases in which the findings are insufficiently detailed to indicate the
factual basis for the findings. Woodward v.Fazzio. 823 P.2d 474, 477-78 (Utah
Ct. App. 1991).
2)

Did the trial court err in concluding that the reasonable cost of completing
the work identified to the contract is $18,210?
In reviewing the trial court's conclusions of law, the appellate court
1

reviews for correctness and accords no deference.

K.J. Scharf v. BMG

Corporation. 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985).
3)

Did the trial court fail to apply Utah law in concluding that the amount of
damages to which Fortune is entitled is $33,590.00, as set forth in the
court's fifth conclusion of law?
The appropriate standard of review of this issue is a review for

correctness. Anesthesiologists Associates of Ogden v. St Benedict's Hospital.
884 P.2d 1236, 1238 (Utah 1994) (on legal questions, "we accord the
conclusions of the court below no particular deference but review them for
correctness.").
4)

;

Having concluded that Fortune was entitled to foreclose its mechanic's
lien, did the trial court err when it then failed to award Fortune its legal
fees and costs, which are mandated pursuant to statute?
i

This issue involves a question of law which the appellate court reviews
for correctness, without deference. K.J.Scharf v. BMG Corporation. 700 P.2d
(

1068, 1070 (Utah 1985).
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES, ORDINANCES. AND RULES
Two sections of the Utah Code are determinative with respect to the

{

issue of attorney's fees. They are Section 38-1-7, which provides:
(1) A person claiming benefits under this chapter shall file for
i

2

record with the county recorder of the county in which the
property, or some part of the property, is situated, a written notice
to hold and claim a lien...
• • •

(4)(c) Failure to deliver or mail the notice of lien to the reputed
owner or record owner precludes the lien claimant from an award
of costs and attorneys' fees against the reputed owner or record
owner in an action to enforce the lien.
and Section 38-1-18:
Except as provided in Section 38-11-107, in any action brought to
enforce any lien under this chapter the successful party shall be
entitled to recover a reasonable attorneys' fee, to be fixed by the
court, which shall be taxed as costs in the action.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
This case involves a contract to construct a dried-in shell for a residence
located in rural Summit County, Utah, above 8,000 feet, which at the time of
construction was accessible only by dirt road and only during the late Spring,
Summer and early Autumn. A dispute arose when the owner of the property,
Mr. Larry Alexander ("Alexander"), who was Defendant below and is Appellee
and Cross-Appellant in this Court, failed to pay the second installment on the
contract price.

By that time, he had requested numerous changes to the

construction and significant costs had been incurred. Additionally, Alexander
ran into and dislodged one of the pillars supporting the second floor, at a time
when concrete had been poured on the second level, but had not yet set,
3

causing shifting and damage to the structure and the concrete work.
By the end of September,

1995, even though Plaintiff Fortune

Construction, Inc. ("Fortune") had been on the job since mid-July, had only
been paid $30,000, had expended more than twice that amount, Fortune
stayed on the job to complete those items that were most critical to protect the
structure from weather, as the approach of winter was imminent and the site
was about to become inaccessible.
The following summer, in August 1996, Alexander obtained a report from
Mr. Joseph Crilli, a professional engineer, as to which items needed to be
finalized to complete the contract. Alexander, however, took no steps to
complete any of those items for more than another year. Not surprisingly, there
was damage to the building due to harsh weather conditions and Alexander's
failure to protect the building by doing such things as installing a moisture
barrier.

At the first day of trial in August 1997, the trial court ordered

Alexander to complete most of the items on Mr. Crilli's list in order to protect
the structure, yet even then Alexander did not take care of those items.
Fortune filed a lien against the Alexander property and then initiated this
action to foreclose the lien, and to recover damages for breach of contract, or
payment based on quantum meruit or unjust enrichment. Alexander answered
and

counterclaimed against Fortune for breach of contract and breach of
4

warranty and asserted affirmative defenses including duress.
Disposition Below
After 3 days of trial, held on August 12, December 10 and December 23,
1997, the trial court signed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment
on August 2 1 , 1 9 9 8 (R. 238 - 240). A copy of the Findings, Conclusions and
Judgment is attached to the Appendix hereto as Exhibit "A". The court ruled
that Fortune should be allowed to foreclose its lien and awarded Fortune
$33,590. in damages, but did not award attorney fees and costs. Counsel for
the parties did not receive copies of the Judgment until Thursday, September
17, 1998. Although Fortune's counsel would have preferred to resolve certain
unclear or inadequately detailed items contained in the Judgment by postjudgment motion, counsel was unable to get an extension to file a notice of
appeal on September 18, so that Fortune had no choice but to file this appeal
on Friday, September 18, 1998. Alexander thereafter filed a cross-appeal.
Statement of Facts
Plaintiff Fortune Construction, Inc., a licensed general contractor in Utah,
and Defendant Larry Alexander, the owner of an isolated, high-altitude building
lot in Summit County, Utah, entered into a written contract in 1995 for the
construction of a dried-in shell for a residence on Alexander's lot. (R. 240
Finding 1). The contract dated September 22, 1995 and signed September 25,
5

1995 by Fortune and Alexander (the "Contract") was introduced and admitted
at trial as Exhibit N (R. 379 at 38); a copy of the Contract is attached to the
Appendix hereto as Exhibit "B"). The contract was executed several weeks
after Fortune began construction on Alexander's lot in mid-July. (R. 379 at
78). The contract price was $97,600.00, due in four installments of which
Alexander paid only the first installment of $30,000.00. (R. 240 Finding of
Fact 2.)

However, after Alexander refused to make the payment, Fortune

continued to work at the job site for four to five days to protect the structure
from the effects of winter at over 8,000 feet. (R. 239-240 Finding 5).
After Fortune pulled off the job-site, Alexander failed to complete the
work identified to the contract, despite a letter to Alexander from Joseph Crilli,
the professional engineer who engineered the project, indicating a need to
complete certain items. (R. 239 Finding 6). For over eighteen (18) months
Alexander failed to take action to protect the structure from degradation caused
by leaving the structure unprotected from weather and moisture.

(R. 239

Finding 7). On August 12, 1997, using the Crilli letter as a guide, the Court
ordered Alexander to complete the contract work to protect the structure from
another winter's exposure. However, Alexander failed to do the work ordered
by the Court. (R. 239 Findings 8 and 9). In addition to failing to complete the
contract work, Alexander could have installed a moisture barrier and insulation

6

before the winter of 1995, but did not do so. (R. 239 Finding 10).
Fortune filed timely notice of a lien against Alexander's property in the
amount of $67,600 and provided Alexander with timely notice of the lien filing.
Plaintiff's Complaint at 11 16, 18 (R. 016-17); Defendant's Answer at 11 16,
18 (R. 031), and the trial court so found. (R. 239 Finding 11). The notice of
lien failed to subtract the amount necessary to complete the work identified to
the contract from the contract price, but was otherwise accurate. (R. 239
Finding 12). Fortune's expert, Brent Thomas, a licensed structural engineer,
testified that the cost to complete the Contract was between $4,000 and
$5,000. (R. 379 at 162).
Fortune filed a timely action to foreclose its lien and the trial court ruled
that Fortune would be allowed to foreclose its lien against Alexander. (R. 238
Conclusion 3). Although Alexander filed a counterclaim against Fortune for
breach of contract, breach of warranty and negligence and asserted affirmative
defenses, the trial court did not rule in Alexander's favor on those claims and
defenses. (R. 238-40).
At trial, there was considerable testimony by Alexander and a contractor
ultimately hired by Alexander in 1997, Ronald Elwood Hansen, as to work that
was done to the structure in late 1997. Mr. Hansen testified that he could not
have done the repairs that he did for less than $5,000 (R. 249 at 88). Instead,
7

Mr. Hansen testified to labor costs of $1,600 (R.249 at 80) and material costs
of $16,164.23 (R.249 at 87). Alexander's Exhibit 1, apparently prepared by
Mr. Hansen, indicates that the total cost of repairs to the house is $46,785.05.
(Defendant's Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, R.228 f 10)
According to Alexander's Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law,
Mr. Hansen estimated that additional work that is required to complete the
house will include: $34,000 to rebuild the dormers, $904 to double the TJI's
under the balconies, $1,700 to temper and reinstall windows, $11,481 to
repair and reinstall the boiler, $7,050 to remove and replace the concrete floor
in order to repair the heating system and an additional $55,135 "to complete
repair work and bring the home to a structurally sound dried-in shell that
complies with building code requirements." (R. 228 1 1 1 ) .

Having reviewed

the work that was done by Alexander and his contractor, however, Fortune's
expert, Brent Thomas, a licensed Professional Engineer and Utah Certified
Structural Engineer, stated in a sworn affidavit that in his "professional opinion
the procedures followed by Mr. Alexander, apparently at the direction of Mr.
Carlson [Alexander's engineer], were economically wasteful, unnecessary and
counterproductive." (Affidavit of Brent F. Thomas, R.174-75)(emphasis added).1

1

'"•"'

Rather than extending the trial by taking testimony from an
engineer hired by Alexander, who failed to appear on either
8

By Wiiy i.il uKciiiiploL>, Alc.iniU'i w.inr, in lepairthe dormers and make
them functional, rather than ornamental, by removing most of the roof in order
to reinstall the dormers. (R. 249 at 51-52). However, according to Brent
Thomas,
Mr. Alexander's contractor's testimony as to the need to remove
the existing roof trusses makes no sense from an economic or
engineering standpoint. In my professional opinion, should Mr.
Alexander wish to depart from the original plans to make the
dormers accessible from the interior of the residence, then the
header beams could be engineered to carry the anticipated loads
and the existing roof structure trusses cut out as required. The
contractor's proposed change is not required to build the residence
to the original plans and is in my professional opinion far more
expensive than necessary to accomplish the desired change.
(Thomas Affidavit, R. 150-51).
Additionally, cross-bracing of the carport had been called for in the plans,
but was one of the items that Fortune was not able to complete prior to leaving
the job-site

aintiff's Exhibit S).

Instead of simply installing the braces according to the plans and pursuant to
the directions of Mr. Crilli, Alexander closed in the carport with plywood
sheathing.

Brent Thomas stated that this was unnecessary and actually

of the days during which testimony was taken, and
rebuttal by Fortune's engineer, Brent Thomas, and Pat
Fortune, the parties stipulated that the evidence would be
presented by affidavits. (R. 249 at 91-92: Order, R. 13638).
9

detrimental to the structure.
The installation of the plywood sheathing on the interior and
exterior faces of the carport's walls was unnecessary and not in
accordance with the plans.
Previous testimony from Mr.
Alexander's contractor stated that this sheathing was installed to
serve as a vertical diaphragm or shear wall. These walls do not
meet code requirements for vertical shear walls and if they did, the
anticipated shear due to horizontal loading does not necessitate
sheathing on both faces. The installation of diagonal bracing
between the timber columns would have provided better lateral
stability and been a more economical solution than the framing and
sheathing actually installed.
(Affidavit, R.143).
Alexander also points out that there are windows in the structure that
require tempered glass. The need for tempered glass, however, only arose
because Alexander made design changes which required tempered glass after
the windows were ordered and installed (R. 344 at 64-65; Affidavit of Pat
Fortune, R. 156-57).
As a final example, although there are many others, Alexander testified
that the boiler is not working, and the heating system, consisting of pipes in the
concrete floor of the second level, is leaking, so that it will cost $11,480 to
repair and reinstall the boiler.

(R. 344 at 55-56).

Additionally, Alexander

contends that it will cost $7,050 to remove and replace the concrete floor in
order to repair the heating system. (R. 228 1 1 1 ) . Alexander testified that the
boiler "was frozen and cracked beyond repair." R. 344 at 55). In his rebuttal
10

affidavit, •' i' ' • M»InirI '.idle'' "«.T '»•<'.»•«' '» l"i» !'>*> |nii m ihe fall of 1995, the
in-floor heating system was installed and pressure tested and the pipes and the
boiler were filled with pure glycol; additionally, the system was pressurized
during the concrete pour in the residence. It was Pat Fortune's opinion that the
leaks in the system wert

caused '»y ,,t;fi •<> iJ.Hmdu." ('

" Affidavit, R.

157). However, just after the concrete was poured, Alexander ran into one of
the 12 inch diameter wood columns that supported the second level floor with
a backhoe and knocked the column out, while the concrete was still setting.
The result was that the concrete

mi ieve
of that day explains the situation:

Q
During the time you were working on the project, did the
owner do any damage to the structure?
A
Well, he ran into the building a couple times with a backhoe.
The day that we poured the concrete on the upper floor, half of
which is supported by four poles under the right side of the building
there. You can see the drive through area. The concrete was
poured on the upper floor, which is a concrete inch and a half thick
which encases the heat tubes. It's hydronic heat throughout the
building. I got home, and it must have been I wasn't home 15 or
20 minutes, and I got a call he had hit one of the posts with the
backhoe and knocked it out and the main floor beam - it has a
center beam coming through running this way in the building, that
was knocked out.
Q
Along this axis?
A
Right. The floor had sagged about a foot and a half with the
wet concrete in it. So I jumped in my truck went back up there.
I had to take a 20-ton jack and jack that floor back into position.
Of course, the concrete was almost set at the time so I'm surprised
it didn't break any of the heat tubes, which I don't think it did
11

Mr.

I

might have, but I don't think it did.
(R. 344 at 84-85).
In final argument Fortune called to the Court's attention the Utah rule for
the calculation of damages for an incomplete fixed price construction contract
as set forth in Holman v. Sorenson.

(R. 344 at page 12), and asserted

Fortune's claim for attorney's fees and costs under the mechanic's lien
statutes. (R. 344 at page 13).
Following the conclusion of final arguments, on December 3 1 , 1997,
Judge Brian's Summit County rotation ended and he returned to full time
service on the bench in Salt Lake City. Because of irregularities in the way the
court's file was managed, counsel for Fortune and Alexander received notice
of the Court's Findings, Conclusions and Judgment on Thursday, September
17,1998, which was almost a month after signing and only one day before the
deadline for filing a notice of appeal. Fortune's motion for an extension of time
to file the notice of appeal was denied on the following day, and Fortune was
forced to file its notice of appeal. Because of the lack of notice, both parties
were denied the possibility of arguing post-judgment motions to modify or
clarify certain ambiguous items contained in the Judgment.

12

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
I. The trial court found that there was a written contract between the
parties and that the contract price was $97,600 (R. 238 Finding 2). The court
then found that the reasonable value of the improvements
property was

;exander «,

Finding 131

pvo mi

indication of how the court arrived at that number or on what evidence the
court relied to compute that amount. Furthermore, there is no clear evidence
that established the $81,800 amount, so that Finding of Fact 1 A is mot
supported by sufficient evidence.
II. Although the trial court has concluded that the reasonable cost of
completing the Contract work is $18,210, the court has provided no legal basis
for such a conclusion. Nor does there appear to be a basis in the evidence, as
there are differing numbers that were presented by both sides, none <>l wliu L
is equal

Withoi

evidentiary basis, and because the

amounts are disputed, the $18,210. number cannot be established, and the
court's conclusion is without support.
'"

Utah case law on the determination of damages in an unfinished

construction

damages

contract price less the amount saved by the non-breaching party, which is the
amount that would have been expended in completing the contract. Because
13

the trial court failed to apply that measure of damages in this case, the award
of damages to Plaintiff is not correct and should be changed to the contract
price, less the amount paid and less the reasonable cost of contract completion.
IV.

The Utah Mechanic's Lien statute provides that if a party is

successful in bringing an action to foreclose a lien, and does not fail to mail a
notice of the lien to the property owner, such party shall be entitled to recover
a reasonable attorneys' fee. In this case, Fortune properly filed the lien, mailed
the notice to Alexander and the trial court ruled that Fortune was entitled to
foreclose its lien. On that basis, the court should have awarded attorney fees
and costs to Fortune.
ARGUMENT
POINT I:

There is insufficient evidence to support the trial
court's finding that the reasonable value of the
improvements to Defendant's property is not less than
$81,800.

In its thirteenth Finding of Fact, the trial court found that, "[T]he
reasonable value of the improvements to Defendant's property is not less than
$81,800 which Defendant has only paid $30,000."

The latter part of the

finding, referring to the amount paid by Alexander, is accurate and supported
by the evidence. However, to the extent that the trial court found that the
value of the improvements is $81,800, this finding is not supported by the

14

evidence.
Findings of fact are not set aside unless they are determined to be
"clearly erroneous." Rule 52(a), Ut. R. Civ. P. In order to challenge a finding
of a trier of fact, it is well established that the party challenging the finding
must marshal all of the evidence supporting the finding and then show that the
evidence is not sufficient to support the finding, even when the evidence is
viewed in the light most favorable to the court's finding. See, e.g., Bailey-Allen
Co.. Inc. v. Kurzet. 945 P.2d 180, 186 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). In some cases,
however, a finding may be sufficiently inadequate that marshaling the evidence
is futile. Woodward v. Fazzio. 823 P.2d 474, 477-78 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).
Fortune believes that the trial court's thirteenth finding of fact falls into that
category. Nonetheless, even if the relevant evidence is reviewed, it provides
no basis for the finding in question.
A consideration of the evidence presented by Alexander at trial gives no
indication that the "reasonable value of the improvements to Alexander's
property is not less than $81,800...." The original contract price was $97,600.
The Contract dated September 22, 1995 and signed September 25, 1995 by
Fortune and Alexander (the "Contract") was introduced and admitted at trial as
Exhibit N (R. 379 at 38); a copy of the Contract is attached to the Appendix
hereto as Exhibit "A". It is reasonable that in order to determine the value of

15

the improvements Fortune made to the Alexander property, the trial court might
have considered the contract price, less the reasonable cost to complete the
contract items. See, Holman v. Sorenson. 556 P.2d 499, 500-01 (Utah 1976).
The $81,800 does not, however, appear to reflect any of the numbers that
might have been applied by the court in that determination.
Pat Fortune, one of the principals of the Fortune and the general
contractor performing the work under the Contract testified that at the time
that Fortune left the job based on Alexander's failure to pay, there were certain
contract items that had not been completed. Mr. Fortune testified that the cost
to complete those items would have been $3,400 to $3,500. (R. 379 at 96).
Fortune's structural engineer testified that the cost to complete the items
identified to the Contract would be just under $5,000. (R. 379 at 162). Not
surprisingly, the contractor hired by Alexander in 1997, Ronald Elwood Hansen,
testified to work that he performed on the house, and stated that he could not
have done the repairs that he did for less than $5,000 (R. 249 at 88). Mr.
Hansen, testified to work that he performed on the house, most of which was
related to repairing damage caused by Alexander's neglect and to design
changes ordered by Alexander, (R.239, Findings 6,7,8,9,10; R. 379 at 37, 5152, 62-66), as set forth at pages 7 through 11 above. Thus, Mr. Hansen
testified to numerous repairs and changes with varying costs for labor and
16

materials, no combination of which can be made to fit the Court's finding that
the reasonable value of the Fortune's improvements to the property was
$81,800, or the court's conclusion that the reasonable cost of completing the
work identified to the contract is $18,210. Although it is Fortune's position
that Mr. Hansen's numbers reflect enormous waste and an attempt by
Alexander to build a structure that has no relationship to the work that was to
be completed by Fortune, none of the numbers supports the $81,800 amount.
A number that is closer to the trial court's Finding 13 was given in the
testimony of Heidi Fortune, the Vice President of Fortune who, because of her
20 year background in finance, is responsible for all bookkeeping, invoicing and
payment. (R. 379 at 16). Heidi Fortune testified that in total, Fortune paid out
$86,231.71 on the Alexander project prior to the time that Fortune left the job
in 1995, of which $10,987.48 was for labor, with the remainder [$75,244.23]
being for materials. (R. 379 at 37-38). It is very possible that the court took
the figure of $86,000 and subtracted $4,200, a number that is within the range
that Fortune's expert testified would be the cost to complete the contract
(R.379 at 162), to arrive at the finding that the value of the improvements was
$81,800.
The problem with the trial court's thirteenth finding of fact is that even
if there is some combination of these numbers that adds up to $81,800, the
17

trial court has certainly not indicated what that combination is.

Although

Woodward v. Fazzio. 823 P.2d 474 (Utah Ct. App. 1991), involves a
termination of parental rights, Woodward is a case in which the nature of the
trial court's findings prevent a reasonable resolution of the case and, therefore,

(

can clearly be applied to Finding 13 in the instant case. In Woodward v. Fazzio.
the Court of Appeals stated that marshaling the evidence reminds both the
litigants and the appellate court of the high degree of deference that is accorded
the finder of fact, Woodward. 823 P.2d at 477 (quoting State v. Moore. 802
P.2d 732, 739 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).

"However, we will only grant this

i

deference when the findings of fact are sufficiently detailed to disclose the
evidentiary basis for the court's decision." Woodward, at 478.

<

Although a trier of fact's finding of fact is generally entitled to great
deference, in this case, Finding of Fact 13 simply does not deserve that type
i

of consideration. Because Finding 13 is not clear as to how it is supported by
the evidence in this case, it must be stricken and revised to reflect its
evidentiary basis and to conform to that evidence. The reasonable value of the
improvements to the Alexander property is the contract price, less a reasonable
amount to complete the items identified to the Contract. Based on competent
testimony, that amount was less than $5,000 so that Finding 13 should have
equaled $91,600.

?
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POINT II:

The trial court erred when it concluded that the
"reasonable amount of completing the work identified
to the contract is $18,210."

The difficulty with the trial court's conclusion that the cost of completion
of the contract is that there is no indication of how the court made this
determination. The question of the cost of contract completion is central to this
case, because the appropriate measure of damages is the contract price less the
reasonable cost to complete the contract.

See, Stanql v. Marathon Steel

Company. 554 P.2d 1316 (Utah 1976). However, because there is no factual
support for this amount, the damages cannot be accurately determined. If for
no other reason than that, this conclusion must be reversed and remanded to
the trial court for reconsideration.
Alexander testified that he could have completed the work on the
contract and insulated the house in the winter of 1995, but that he did not take
the required remedial steps to protect his residence, because he did not want
to cover up any evidence to support his case so that he did not want to do
anything until his lawyers told him he could.

(R. 379 at 63).

Instead,

Alexander let the house deteriorate, and now believes that the cost of repairing
the house will be $101,920.05. On that basis, Alexander believes that he
should be entitled to receive $34,320.05 from Fortune (Defendant's Proposed
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, R.200-05 at 201).
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There is no

support for Alexander's proposition, and it is clear from the trial court's
judgment that the trial court refused to accept Alexander's wishful thinking.
It is wholly unclear, however, how the trial court arrived at its conclusion as
to the cost of completion of the contract.
Fortune's expert, a certified structural engineer, presented competent
evidence that the cost of completion was less than $5,000.

Alexander's

contractor, who admitted that he did not receive engineering specifications for
the work that he did and that he did not have an engineering background
himself (R. 0249 at 89-90), testified that the cost to repair the house was
anywhere from $46,785 to $ 101,920. But none of the evidence supports the
conclusion that the cost to complete the contract was $18,210.
A trial court's conclusion of law is not entitled to deference on review by
an appellate court. K.J. Scharf v. BMG Corporation. 700 P.2d 1068, 1070
(Utah 1985). Admittedly, this conclusion appears to be more factual than legal,
but the trial court itself determined that its statement as to the cost of
completion of the contract was a conclusion of law. This Court is, therefore,
entitled to simply review for correctness.

Jo\

Because the trial court's

conclusion is without support, it is not correct, and must be stricken.

(
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POINT III: The trial court's determination of the amount of
damages to which Fortune is entitled fails to
appropriately apply Utah law and must be corrected.
The trial court found that the "reasonable value" of Fortune's work in
making improvements to Alexander's property was "not less than $81,800,"
and that Defendant had only paid $30,000. (R. 239 Finding 13). While there
is no dispute that Alexander only paid Fortune $30,000 on the $97,600
Contract, there is dispute as to the value placed on Fortune's work. Similarly,
Fortune challenges the trial court's conclusion that the cost to complete the
items identified to the Contract is $18,210. Even assuming, however, that the
trial court can establish the basis for the $81,800 amount and for the $18,210
amount, the trial court has not correctly applied Utah law by awarding Fortune
damages in the amount of $33,590.
In order to arrive at the damage award, the trial court took the
"reasonable value of the improvements," and subtracted the amount paid by
Alexander and the "reasonable amount of completing the work identified to the
contract." In light of the fact the trial court ruled that there was a contract
between these parties (R. 240 Finding 1), the trial court's calculation of
damages is incorrect.
It is undisputed law of this state and the general consensus of legal
writers that breach of construction damages are based upon the
total amount promised for the project, less the reasonable cost of
21

completing it.
Holman v. Sorenson. 556 P.2d 499, 500 (Utah 1976).

In John Call

Engineering. Inc. v. Manti City Corp.. 795 P.2d 678 (Utah Ct. App.1990), a
construction case in which Manti City had been found to have breached an
engineering contract with the plaintiff, the court specifically followed Holman.
Damages were, therefore, to be calculated based on "the amount plaintiff
would have received had the contract been completed less the expenses
plaintiff saved by not having to perform." ioLat681.
In Keller v. Deseret Mortuary Company. 455 P.2d 197 (Utah 1969), the
Utah Supreme Court responded to a defendant's argument that the plaintiff
should have only been able to recover "the reasonable value of the work
performed and the materials furnished," which is basically what the trial court
concluded in the instant case. On the contrary, the Court stated that where a
construction claim is based on a definite contract, the trial court had properly
awarded damages based on "the total amount promised or the project, less the
reasonable cost of completing it." Keller. 455 P.2d at 198.
The correct measure of damages in this case would, therefore, be the
contract price of $97,600, less the payment of $30,000, and less the
reasonable cost to complete the items identified to the Contract, as established
by competent evidence. Because the trial court failed to properly apply Utah
22

law when it awarded damages to Fortune in this case, and because the trial
court's conclusion as to the cost of contract completion is unsupported in the
record, the Court must vacate the damage award and remand for a
redetermination of damages based on competent evidence and the applicable
l a w .

'••-••'

POINT IV: The trial court's failure to award attorney's fees to
Fortune constitutes error.
After Alexander failed to pay Fortune, Fortune filed a mechanic's lien on
the Alexander property, pursuant to Utah statute. Utah Code Annotated §38-11 et seq. Fortune properly gave notice of the lien by mail to Alexander as the
owner of the real property pursuant to Utah Code Annotated

§38-1-7,

Plaintiff's Complaint at UK 16, 18 (R. 016-17); Defendant's Answer at W 16,
18 (R. 031), and the trial court so found. (R. 239 1 1 1 ) . The trial court noted
that the lien failed to subtract the specific amount necessary to complete the
contract, "but was otherwise accurate." (R. 239 % 12). On that basis, the trial
court ruled in Fortune's favor that "It is reasonable and proper that Plaintiff be
allowed to foreclose its mechanic's lien." (R. 240 1 3). The court then ruled
that each party was to bear its own legal fees and costs. (R. 240 1 4). That
ruling constitutes error in light of Utah law.
The purpose of the mechanic's lien statutes is protection of those who
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increase the value of real property by supplying materials or labor, and the
statutes will be liberally construed to promote that purpose. Interiors
Contracting Inc. v. Navalco. 648 P.2d 1382 (Utah 1982). Awarding fees and
costs to a party prevailing in an action to foreclose a lien is part of the
protection afforded, because otherwise a contractor might not have sufficient
resources to obtain the protection that the statutes are designed to provide.
The statutory scheme places certain limitations and requirements on the right
to receive fees and costs, but once those limitations and requirements are
satisfied, the party is entitled to an award of costs and fees. Examples of such
limitations and requirements are the time limits in which to file the notice of
lien, the requirement that notice of the lien be provided to the property owner,
and the requirement that the lien claimant prevail in the action to foreclose the
lien. Thus, Utah Code Annotated Section 38-1-7 provides:
(1) A person claiming benefits under this chapter shall file for
record with the county recorder of the county in which the
property, or some part of the property, is situated, a written notice
to hold and claim a lien within 90 days of the date:
(a) the person last performed labor or service ... for a residence as
defined in Section 38-11-102;
(4)(c) Failure to deliver or mail the notice of lien to the reputed
owner or record owner precludes the lien claimant from an award
of costs and attorneys' fees against the reputed owner or record
owner in an action to enforce the lien.
Because Fortune timely filed its lien and did not fail to mail the notice to
i
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Alexander (R. 016-17; R. 0 3 1 ; R.239), Fortune has satisfied the requirements
of Section 38-1-7, such that Fortune is entitled to an award of its costs and
fees.
Similarly, Utah Code Annotated Section 38-1-18 provides:
Except as provided in Section 38-11-107, in any action brought to
enforce any lien under this chapter the successful party shall be
entitled to recover a reasonable attorneys' fee, to be fixed by the
court, which shall be taxed as costs in the action.
(Emphasis added). The trial court ruled that Fortune is properly entitled to
foreclose its lien on the Alexander property, which makes Fortune the
successful party in this matter and the award of reasonable attorney's fees is,
therefore, mandatory.
In a very recent case, J.V. Hatch Construction. Inc. v. Kampros. 971 P.2d
8 (Utah Ct. App.1998), this Court held that because Section 38-1-18 provides
that the successful party in a mechanic's lien case is entitled to fees, the lien
claimant's prima facie evidence establishing the entitlement to fees is proof that
the claimant is the prevailing party.

Fortune has established that it is the

prevailing party: the trial court granted Fortune the right to foreclose its lien.
(R. 240 5 3). Therefore, there is no basis on which to deny Fortune an award
of reasonable attorney's fees incurred in this matter.
In at least one Utah case in which the plaintiff contractor sued to
foreclose a mechanic's lien and to recover for the owner's breach of contract,
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the trial court refused to award attorney's fees to either party, although the
court did award damages to the plaintiff. Holman v. Sorenson, 556 P.2d 499,
501 (Utah 1976).

In Holman. the defendant had counterclaimed against

plaintiff for breach of contract, and the trial court ruled that both parties had
breached the contract, but awarded plaintiff "net damages." id at 500. There
is dicta in the case regarding the possibility that the trial judge may have found
the mutual breach "to avoid what appeared to be the mandatory language of
[section] 38-1-18," but there is no further treatment of the issue. Holman may
be distinguished from the instant case based on the clear ruling of the trial court
that Fortune may foreclose its mechanic's lien and that Fortune is entitled to
damages based on its claims of breach of contract, quantum meruit and unjust
enrichment (R. 240 f f 2,3,5,6). Significantly, unlike Holman. in this case there
is nothing in the trial court's judgment that reflects that Fortune in any way
breached the Contract.
If the contractor is allowed to foreclose its mechanic's lien, this Court has
held that the contractor is entitled to a reasonable attorney fee. Bailev v. Call.
767 P.2d 138 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), cert, denied 773 P.2d 45 (Utah 1989).
The trial court's denial of attorney fees in Bailey was reversed and the case was
remanded to the trial court for a determination of reasonable attorney fees. io\
Similarly, in Reeves v. Steinfeldt. 915 P.2d 1073 (Utah Ct. App.), the court
looked at the language of Section 38-1-18, held that n[t]he language of the
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statute is mandatory, not discretionary," id at 1079, and remanded to the trial
court for an award of fees.
Finally, an appeal from a lawsuit that is brought to enforce a mechanic's
lien is considered to be part of the action to which Section 38-1-18 refers, so
that the successful party in an appeal will be entitled to an award of fees.
Richards v. Security Pacific. 849 P.2d 606 (Utah Ct. App. 1993), cert, denied,
859 P.2d 585 (Utah 1993).

See also, J.V. Hatch Construction. Inc. v.

Kampros. 971 P.2d 8, 16 (Utah Ct. App. 1998).
This Court should, therefore, reverse the trial court's denial of attorney
fees and costs, and remand for an award of reasonable fees and costs incurred
by Fortune both at trial and on appeal.
CONCLUSION
This construction case is based on a contract which one party tried to
fulfill and the other party did not. Fortune worked hard to build the first stage
of the residence that Alexander wanted, which is all that was required of
Fortune under the Contract. What Alexander had to do was to pay Fortune
what Alexander had agreed to pay, and not interfere with the construction
process, but Alexander did not do that. When Alexander failed to pay Fortune
pursuant to the Contract terms, Alexander breached the Contract, and Fortune
left the job because it was not getting paid. At that point, what Alexander had
to do was to finish the various items that were necessary to protect the
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building from the harsh local weather conditions, but Alexander did not do that,
either.

*

Alexander had the benefit of owning and using the residence for almost
two years without taking the responsibility to finish what was needed to
protect the building, let alone taking the responsibility to pay Fortune for its
work on the residence. Alexander would like to hold Fortune responsible for all
of the problems that have been caused by almost two years of neglect, but the
trial court did not allow that.
The trial court awarded judgment in favor of Fortune and ruled that
Alexander failed to take the steps that were necessary to protect the property,
that Fortune can foreclose its mechanic's lien on the Alexander property, and
that Fortune is entitled to damages. The trial court did not, however, base its
finding as to the reasonable value of the improvements to the property on
evidence that can be determined in the record. Similarly, the trial court's
conclusion as to the reasonable cost of completion of the work identified to the
Contract is unsupported in the record, and the trial court failed to apply Utah
law in determining the amount of damages to which Fortune is entitled in this
matter. Finally, the trial court failed to award fees and costs to Fortune, despite
the statutory mandate to do so.

For those reasons, Fortune has filed this

appeal.
Fortune, therefore, asks this Court to strike the trial court's Finding of
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Fact 13, reverse the Conclusions of Law that improperly determine the
reasonable cost of contract completion and damages, and reverse the trial
court's denial of reasonable fees and costs incurred in this matter, with
instructions to determine and award fees and costs to Fortune, as reasonably
incurred at trial and in this appeal.
Dated this 26 th day of March, 1999.

^ W j u f o . G^dS^
James W. Kennicott
Janet A. Goldstein
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant and CrossAppellee, Fortune Construction, Inc.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that on the "*b day of March, 1999, I caused to be served
two true and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT by handdelivering same to Defendant/Appellee/Cross-Appellant's counsel as follows:
Ralph Curtis
HENRIKSEN & HENRIKSEN
320 South 500 East
Salt Lake City, UT 84102
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Exhibit A

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
CT
SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
By^JThlrcl[>m

* 1,938

°

FORTUNE CONSTRUCTION, INC.,
a Utah Corporation

*^^r

Comnty

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Plaintiff,
vs,
LARRY K. ALEXANDER',

Case #950300151LM

Defendant,

JUDGE PAT B. BRIAN

FINDINGS OP FACT
This matter having come before the court for trial on August
12, 1997, ..continuing on December 10, 1997 and final arguments .;
having been heard on December 23, 1997 and the Court being fully
advised herein, the Court enters the Findings of Fact as follows:

1.

The only contract between the parties is Plaintiff's

exhibit "N" which was signed by the parties on September 25,
1995.

•

2.

The Contract price was $97,600, due in four

>':.-.

>*

installments of which Defendant paid only the first installment
of $30,000.
3.

Defendant failed to pay the second, third and fourth

installments due under the contract.
5.

After Defendant refused to make the payment, Plaintiff-

t-ilt \\a* h+ rr% an

v

^

w

continued to work at the job site for four to five days to
protect the structure from the effects of winter at 8,000 feet.
6.

Defendant failed to complete the work identified in the

contract until ordered by the Court on August 12, 1997, despite a
letter from Joseph Crilli, professional engineer, indicating the
need to complete certain items.
7.

Defendant failed to take action for over 18 months to

protect the structure from degradation caused by leaving the
structure unprotected from weather and moisture.
8.

On August 12, 1997 the Court ordered Defendant to

complete the contract work to protect the structure from another
winterfs exposure.
9.

Defendant failed to do the work ordered by the Court on

August 12, 1997.
10.

Defendant could have installed a moisture barrier and

insulation before the winter of 1995, but did not do so.
11.

Plaintiff timely filed notice of a lien against

Defendants property in the amount of $67, 600 * and provided
Defendant with timely notice of the lien filing.
12.

The notice of the lien failed to subtract the amount

necessary to complete the work identified to the contract from
the contract price, but was otherwise- accurate.
13.

The reasonable value of the improvements to Defendant's

property is not less than $81,800 which Defendant has only paid
$30,000..
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Having entered the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court

reaches the following Conclusions of Law:
1.

The reasonable amount of completing the work identified

to-the contract is $18,210.
2.

It is reasonable and proper that the Plaintiff be

awarded the sum of $81,800 less the foregoing cost of completion
and the initial payment amount of $30,000.
3.

It is reasonable and proper that Plaintiff be allowed

to foreclose its mechanic's lien.
4.

Each party shall bear their own legal fees and costs.

5.

It is reasonable and proper that Plaintiff be awarded

the sum of $33,590 for the reasonable value of materials and
services provided for the benefit of Defendant on Plaintiff's
claim for guantuin meruit.
6.

It is reasonable and proper that Defendant pay to

Plaintiff the sum of $33,590 as compensation on Plaintiff's claim
for unjust enrichment.
JUDGMENT
Having reached the foregoing Conclusions of Law, the Court
enters Judgment in favor of Plaintiff in the sum of $33,590

DATED this Q j day of August, 1998

~rt t-.&.ts
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Exhibit B

his agreement is between (Contractor):
Date: September 22, 1995

cfobiune ^Dim&foucliony &nc.
P. O. Box 684
Midway, UT 84049
(801) 654-2337

Project name: Alexander (INV 64)
Address: Forest Meadow
LotD-100
City, State, ZIP: Summit County

nd (Owner):
fame:

Larry Alexander

T>&^ TrrbcjepA-- ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ + - c ° ^

xidress:

1576 South 1000 East

ity, State, ZIP:

Salt Lake City, UT 84105

^

(

n C

ontractor will furnish all labor and materials to construct and complete the project described above in a good
,

1M

workmanlike manner:

Design/Draft Blue Prints, Coordinate Excavation/Septic System/ Utah PowerAVater Service

edestal to Street Power, Foundation, Framing, Ext. Windows and Doors, Building Permit, Dry-in, Rough Plumb,
lectrical, Heat, Steel Roof.

l accordance with following contract documents:

Building Permit #95462 - Summit County, UT, and Blue Prints

>ages 1-13) engineered by Joseph Crilly, P.E.,

(93261981 -2202Tdated 7/4/95

hvner agrees to pay Contractor the total sum of:

397300.00

istallments to be made as follows:

$30,000 to begin (received) which includes $14,781.10 paid out by
contractor to date of 9/7/95
$30,000 upon completion of exterior wall, rough plumbing and
rough electrical.

unds are to be disbursed by:

$30,000 upon completion of truss installation and dry-in. >
$^7,600 balance upon completion of windows/doors and steel roof install
($9,760 contingency)

/
S\

w-

ft«M t u V i . v Y ^ c w ^ ^ Z ^ T C T T w I Z r T u ^ ^ <Hc^jc<L\T^
iO'.TW^IDo u^TA-Ho a i l / v m ^ t n ^ &A CwmLr>

fork shall commence:

ff

9/7/95

nd shall be complete within the following-number of working days:

180 d ^ l

)wner signature:

/ ^ >

>ate signed:

Contractor:

7/*s/rs

Date signed:

<?- ^U^

^^ZL,

—%5"

^

